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Abstract:  We assess the welfare effects of highway privatization accounting for 
government’s behavior in setting the sale price, firms’ strategic behavior in setting tolls 
in various competitive environments, and motorists’ heterogeneous preferences for 
speedy and reliable travel.  We conclude motorists can benefit from privatization if they 
are able to negotiate aggressively with a private provider to obtain tolls and service that 
align with their varying preferences.  Surprisingly, motorists are likely to be better off 
negotiating with a monopolist than with duopoly providers or under public-private 
competition.  Toll regulation may be counterproductive because it would treat motorists 
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Introduction 
U.S. highways are experiencing a “perfect storm:” traffic congestion and delays are 
imposing ever greater costs on motorists and shippers; poorly maintained roads and bridges 
continue to damage vehicles and pose threats to travelers’ safety; and for the first time since the 
Highway Trust Fund was created in 1956, the portion that finances federal highway expenditures 
is running a deficit.
1     
The road system’s poor service quality and growing financial problems can be attributed 
to inefficient government policies, including the failure to charge appropriate prices for 
congestion and pavement damage, suboptimal road design and maintenance practices, and 
regulations that increase production costs (Winston (2000)).  Efficient policies that would 
improve the system’s performance seem politically intractable because they would threaten long-
standing subsidies to road users, rents to suppliers of highway capital and labor, and 
demonstration projects that improve politicians’ re-election prospects.   
After policymakers accepted the fact that their policies were responsible for creating 
significant inefficiencies in intercity transportation, they turned to markets for help by 
deregulating the intercity modes’ economic operations.  As it has become clear that the public 
sector needs a large infusion of money to maintain and expand the highway system, 
policymakers have turned to the private sector for assistance by forming so-called public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), where the government leases a road to a private investor(s) for a specified 
period.
 2  These partnerships are business deals that are intended to provide budgetary relief to 
                                                 
1 Some money in the trust fund is allocated to public transit. 
 
2 Examples of PPPs include the Chicago Skyway, Indiana toll road, and the proposed Trans-
Texas Corridor; high-occupancy-toll (HOT) lanes in California and Texas and that are currently   2
the government and yield an acceptable rate of return for the firms that invest in infrastructure 
subject to government regulations.  At the same time, highway travel conditions may not 
necessarily improve, especially because the contract between the private firm and the 
government may be poorly structured and prevent efficient pricing (Engel et al. (2007)).  A pure 
market solution—namely, highway privatization—would be less encumbered by the government 
and may result in faster and more reliable travel, but it may also produce a welfare loss from 
market power (Vickers and Yarrow (1991)).         
In this paper, we present exploratory empirical evidence on the economic effects of 
highway privatization by developing a stylized model where responsibility for providing 
highway services is transferred from the public sector to a private firm(s).  Given the 
intractability of reforming public provision and the limitations of PPPs, privatization—while 
representing dramatic institutional change—may be the only hope for operating and maintaining 
the nation’s $2.5 trillion road system more efficiently.  Privatization may also be timely because 
the U.S. road network is largely complete and vast, enormously expensive investments in new 
capacity, which arguably justified public ownership and management of the roads in the past, are 
not necessary. 
We analyze our model using data from motorists’ travel on a major highway in 
California.  Although privatization is often thought to produce social benefits by improving 
production efficiency (Roland (2008)), we focus on whether it could benefit motorists by 
improving road pricing and service quality.  We find that under certain conditions highway 
privatization can benefit road users and increase social welfare.  The key to privatization’s 
success is that road users have heterogeneous preferences for highway service—travel speed and 
                                                                                                                                                             
being constructed in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area; and the Dulles-Greenway private 
toll road.   3
reliability—and through negotiations on tolls a private operator(s) may be forced to respond to 
those preferences in ways that public highway authorities have not.  Surprisingly, we conclude 
that motorists are likely to achieve a larger welfare gain negotiating with a monopoly operator 
than with duopoly operators or if the monopoly competed against a public operator.  The 
importance of preference heterogeneity in generating benefits suggests that it would be 
inadvisable to subject private operators to price regulations, which typically treat consumers as 
homogeneous and discourage product differentiation.   
 
Background Literature  
Our assessment of privatization is based on travel on a major limited-access state 
highway in California used heavily by long-distance commuters, but it could also apply to a 
federal highway.  The “price” of travel on most federal and state highways is the gasoline tax, 
which does not vary significantly with the level of traffic congestion.   
Knight (1924) injected a constructive role for privatization by arguing that a private road 
would set an optimal congestion toll if it faced competition from an alternative free (public) road.  
Friedman and Boorstin (1951), early advocates of privatization, suggested that the government 
should account for unfair competition by rebating fuel tax revenues generated by motorists 
driving on the free road to the private road owner.  Even if the rebate does not occur, Viton 
(1995) found that a private road would be financially viable when competing against a public 
road for most types of road users.   Edelson (1971) qualified Knight’s result by showing that it 
holds in the special case that all travelers—including those using a transit alternative to the 
private road—have the same value of time.  If travelers differ in their value of time, the toll could 
result in too much or too little congestion.   De Palma and Lindsey (2000, 2002) and Calcott and   4
Yao (2005) conclude that private operators have incentives to introduce time varying tolls in 
alternative competitive settings.  In sum, previous literature suggests that highway privatization 
could lead to the adoption of congestion pricing, but pricing’s efficiency and distributional 
effects are likely to depend on competitive alternatives to the private road, the heterogeneity of 
travelers’ preferences, and how the government allocates gas tax revenues.   
Although the evidence is circumstantial, recent assessments broadly suggest that highway 
production efficiency in the United States would improve if a private road operator replaced a 
public authority.  Roth (2005) reports that officials in the U.S. Department of Transportation 
estimate federal regulations raise highway project costs 20-30 percent.  Poole and Samuel (2008) 
find that the share of toll revenues consumed by operating and maintenance costs is 43 percent 
for U.S. public toll roads and 23 percent for U.S. private toll roads.  There are examples of 
reasonably low-cost public toll roads with a high cost/revenue ratio because tolls have been too 
low (e.g., the West Virginia Turnpike has not increased its tolls since 1989); but there are also 
examples of private operators whose tolls have been kept down by government caps (e.g., the 
Indiana Toll Road).
3  Finally, evidence from emergency highway repairs following an 
earthquake in 1994 that destroyed a bridge on Interstate 10 in Santa Monica and a gasoline 
tanker crash in 2007 that severely damaged a freeway ramp in Oakland indicates that economic 
incentives substantially reduce the time it takes the private sector to complete highway projects.    
It is debatable whether the public sector’s cost of capital in highway services is higher or 
lower than the private sector’s cost of capital.  In any case, Congress has recently introduced two 
measures that could reduce a private highway firm’s cost of capital.  First, the Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 established a new federal credit program 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Peter Samuel for this point.    5
under which the U.S. Department of Transportation may provide a private firm with taxpayer 
subsidized credit.  Second, as part of the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, state agencies that work with private highway 
firms may issue tax exempt bonds on behalf of the project.    
 
Model 
We consider a multiple-lane highway that is transferred fully or in part to a private 
firm(s).  The highway can be partitioned into two parallel routes, r1 and r2, connecting the same 
origin and destination.  A common example of the network is a carpool lane(s) and general 
purpose lane(s) that comprise highways in many U.S. metropolitan areas.  Privatization could 
arise, for example, if as is often the case in California, the carpool lanes do not meet minimum 
federal standards requiring average peak-period speeds of 45 miles per hour and the state decides 
to allow a private firm to purchase the lanes, set prices, and presumably increase highway 
speeds.  Competitive options include allowing the private firm to also purchase the general 
purpose lanes (monopoly); allowing a different private firm to purchase the general purpose 
lanes (duopoly); and allowing the government to operate the general purpose lanes as a free road 
or a toll road (public-private competition).    
In the cases of monopoly and duopoly we draw an analogy from certain shippers who 
organized into bargaining units following surface freight deregulation (Winston (1998)), and 
improve consumers’ bargaining power (and welfare) by allowing a third party, such as the 
American Automobile Association, to negotiate contracts with a private highway operator to 
determine tolls for road users.  Because a bilateral monopoly arises, we consider a range of toll 
outcomes.     6
Privatization therefore consists of the government selling, not leasing, one or both routes 
to a private firm(s) for a one time payment to the government with all risk transferred to the 
firm(s).  Government determines the highway’s sale price and we explore the effects of 
alternative assumptions about government’s behavior.  A private highway owner(s) is assumed 
to set profit maximizing tolls or tolls that are determined through bargaining.  We do not 
consider the contracting problems that have been identified in public-private partnerships, where 
private firms bid to operate a highway for a fixed period of time.  Engel et al. (2001) have 
developed a “least present value auction,” where the firm that proposes the lowest present value 
of revenues is given the highway franchise and allowed to collect toll revenues until that present 
value is reached.  The franchise then ends and the roads revert to the public sector.  Engel et al. 
(2003) point out that renegotiation of highway franchises reduced their benefits in Latin 
America, and Engel et al. (2006) argue that franchise contracts for private toll roads in the United 
States during the 1990s were flawed because they did not adapt to demand realizations.    
Turning to road users, we capture their heterogeneous preferences for highway services 
by using a demand model that accounts for the variability in the value of travel time and travel 
time reliability.  Motorists are assumed to make the discrete choice of whether to travel and 
conditional on traveling, to make the discrete choice of route (r1 or r2) and vehicle occupancy 
(solo driving or carpooling) that maximizes the utility of their trips.  Finally, because a federal 
trust fund is not necessary to finance (private) roads, we consider the effects of suspending (or 
simply rebating) the state and federal gasoline tax that motorists pay when both routes are 
privatized.  Apparently, Arizona’s 1991 private tollways law was the first to offer motorists the 
opportunity to receive a refund of gasoline taxes paid for miles driven on a private tollway.  In   7
what follows, we develop our empirical specification of highway demand, travel time and 
production costs, and equilibrium.  
Demand.  Let Ω={0,1,…,J} denote the choice set facing a potential road user, where 
alternative 0 is the outside choice of not traveling and alternatives 1–J represent the different 
combinations of routes and vehicle occupancy.   
The utility of individual i choosing alternative 0 is: 
0 0 0 i i U ε δ + =   ,       ( 1 )  
where the traveler’s utility from not traveling is divided into a mean  0 δ , which is constant for all 
motorists, and a random deviation  0 i ε .  The utility of individual i choosing alternative j is:  
ij i j j i j i j i ij B X R T P U ε φ η α + + + + = , j>0 ,        (2) 
where  j P  is the price of the alternative and  i α is the individual’s preference for price;  j T  is the 
travel time of the alternative and  i η is the individual’s preference for travel time;  j R  is the travel 
time uncertainty of the alternative and  i φ is the individual’s preference for time uncertainty; 
j X is a vector of observed exogenous attributes of alternative  j and  i B are the individual’s 
preferences for those attributes; and  ij ε is a random deviation that is independent of the observed 
attributes.  
We assume  N  potential travelers consider using the highway.  Each individual iin the 
sample is drawn from this population.  To account for the heterogeneity in travel preferences, we 
assume the coefficients of equation (2) are normally distributed, conditional on an individual’s 
observed profile denoted by i Z ; hence,  
() ( ) Σ ′ ≡ Θ , ~ , , , γ i i i i i i Z N B φ η α ,      (3)   8
where Σis a diagonal variance matrix, and γis a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
  We specify the joint distribution of  ( ) iJ i i i ε ε ε ε ,..., , 1 0 ≡ by the Generalized Extreme Value 
distribution; thus, the market share of an alternative has the nested-logit form where all the travel 
choices (route and vehicle occupancy) are in one nest with a similarity parameter λ and the 
choice of whether to travel is in another nest.  This specification captures the idea that the 
substitution pattern between any two travel choices is likely to be different from the substitution 
pattern between traveling and not traveling.  Our mixed-logit specification for travel choices 
allows for various potential error correlation patterns among travel alternatives, which could 
arise from individual-specific preferences for travel features that are shared by particular 
alternatives.
 4  
The preceding assumptions imply that the probability of an individual with observed 
characteristics  i Z choosing alternative j is given by:  
()() ∫
Θ
Θ Θ ⋅ Θ =
i
i i i i ij ij d Z f S S ,         ( 4 )  
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is the choice probability conditional on the values of the normal random variates, and 
() ∑
+ + + =
j
B X R T P
i
i j j i j i j i e D
λ φ β α ln      ( 6 )  
is the inclusive value of the travel choices.  The probability of an individual choosing not to 
travel conditional on the values of the normal random variates is: 
                                                 
4 The mixed-logit model is a multinomial logit model with random parameters.     9
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 The expected volume of traffic that is generated by individuals who choose a travel alternative j 
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Demand model parameters.  The values of the parameters of the route-vehicle occupancy 
choice model (equation (2)) are obtained from Small, Winston, and Yan (2006), hereafter SWY.  
SWY conducted surveys in 1999 and 2000—a stable period of highway travel—to analyze 
motorists’ behavior on California State Route 91, a major limited-access expressway used 
heavily by long distance commuters.  A ten-mile stretch in Orange Country includes four free 
lanes and two express lanes in each direction.  Travel times were obtained from field 
measurements at many different times of day, corresponding to the travel periods covered by the 
surveys.  
Motorists who wish to use the express lanes must set up a financial account and carry an 
electronic transponder to pay a toll, which varies hourly according to a preset schedule.  The cost 
of electronic toll collection is small.  Carpools of three or more people could use the express 
lanes during the period of the surveys at a 50 percent discount.  Unlike the regular lanes, the 
express lanes have no entrances or exits between their end points.  SWY analyzed the 
determinants of three simultaneous decisions by motorists: 1) whether to acquire a transponder, 
which gives them the flexibility to use the express lanes whenever they desire; 2) whether to 
travel on the express toll or free lanes for their trip; and 3) how many people to travel with in 
their vehicle: solo, carpool with another person (HOV2), or carpool with at least two other 
people (HOV3).  The three choices are assumed conditional on mode choice (car versus public   10
transport), residential location, and time of day of travel.  We discuss the possible effects of this 
assumption on our findings later.   
  We modify the SWY choice model for our purposes by setting the preference parameter 
for a transponder to zero because all travelers are assumed to have a transponder to travel on the 
tolled highway.  We also set the preference parameter associated with lane choice to zero 
because the two routes under consideration are assumed to be homogeneous; travelers choose 
between them based on the toll, travel times, and travel time uncertainties.  
  The coefficients of the utility function based on motorists’ choices among six alternative 
combinations of route (free or tolled) and vehicle occupancy (solo, HOV2, or HOV3) are shown 
in table 1.
5  The toll (price) coefficient enters the specification separately and is interacted with 
household income; travel time, measured at the median value, is interacted with a cubic function 
of trip distance; and travel time uncertainty, measured as the difference between the 80
th and 50
th 
percentiles of the distribution of travel times, enters separately.
6  The interactions for the toll and 
travel time variables capture observed heterogeneity among travelers.  The HOV2 and HOV3 
dummies indicate (negative) preferences for carpooling, and additional observed heterogeneity is 
indicated by interactions among certain socioeconomic characteristics and a carpool dummy.  
Finally, the model captures unobserved heterogeneity with random coefficients, assumed to be 
                                                 
5 The coefficients are from table 3 of SWY but rescaled using the scale parameter of the 
Brookings RP (revealed preference) sample, which is used in our simulations. 
 
6 SWY found that measuring travel time uncertainty as the difference between the 80
th and 50
th 
percentiles produced a more accurate fit of the model than did alternative measures such as the 
standard deviation.  
   11
normally distributed, for travel time, travel time uncertainty, and the HOV2 and HOV3 
dummies.
7   
The value of travel time (VOT) and value of reliability (VOR) are the ratios of the 
marginal utilities of travel time and travel time uncertainty to the marginal utility of money cost.  










=   .        ( 9 )  
Small and Verhoef (2007) report from a survey of mode choice models that a  reasonable 
average VOT is 50 percent of the gross wage, while Miller (1989) finds an average value from a 
survey of route choice models that is closer to 60 percent of the gross wage.  Small and Verhoef 
point out that VOT estimates vary from roughly 20 to 100 percent of the gross wage.  Table 2 
presents VOT and VOR estimates and shows that motorists’ median values can be interpreted as 
being close to the high end of previous estimates of VOT, indicating that highway service quality 
is important to them.  At the same time, motorists exhibit a wide range of preferences for speedy 
and reliable travel, as the total heterogeneity in the value of time and the value of reliability 
(uncertainty) is roughly aligned with or exceeds the corresponding median value.    
We also need to calibrate the three parameters that are relevant to the outside choice of 
whether to travel: the population size of potential travelers (N ), the mean utility of the outside 
choice ( 0 δ ), and the similarity of the travel choices (λ ).  An additional matter is that private 
                                                 
7 Brownstone and Train (1999) show how such a structure mimics a generalized extreme value 
model that is analogous to a generalized nested logit model with error terms for groups of 
alternatives with different car occupancies (solo, HOV2, HOV3) that are correlated with each 
other.   12
highways are assumed to be funded solely by toll revenues.  Currently, U.S. highways are mainly 
funded by federal and state gasoline taxes, averaging $0.49 per gallon.  We assume that motorists 
do not have to pay those taxes when the highway is privatized, which is equivalent to assuming a 
10%-15% decrease in gasoline prices at their recent level of roughly $4.00 per gallon.  In the 
context of our nested-logit model, where travelers first decide whether to travel and then choose 
a route-vehicle occupancy alternative, lower gasoline prices mainly affect the decision of 
whether to travel and can therefore be captured by expanding the specification of the 
parameter 0 δ in the choice model.  
We specify  0 δ  as a linear function of a motorist’s driving cost( ) E , which includes fuel 
costs as the main component: 
E ⋅ + = δ δ δ ˆ
0 .             (10) 
The average cost of driving in the U.S. is about $0.40 per mile (Langer and Winston (2008)).  
Given the average gas mileage for new and used vehicles in the United States is about 15 to 17 
miles per gallon (www.nhtsa.gov), elimination of the gasoline tax implies that driving costs 
would decline $0.03 to $0.04 (per mile) or roughly 10%.  
To calibrate the four parameters( ) δ δ λ ˆ , , , N , we follow SWY and choose a value ofλ  as 
small as possible without causing numerical instability because we expect the travel alternatives 
to be much closer alternatives to each other than to not traveling.
8  We calibrate the other 
parameters to generate travel conditions that are consistent with previous evidence on travel 
conditions on SR 91: namely, travel times on the free (untolled) lanes are 20 minutes; the 
elasticity of travel with respect to the full cost of travel (including the toll and the value of travel 
                                                 
8 We set λ =0.2 and found in sensitivity tests that alternate values did not have much effect on the 
main findings.  
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time and unreliability) is -0.36; and the elasticity of travel with respect to the driving costs is       
-0.3.
9   
Costs.  The cost side of our model consists of travelers’ time costs and the private firm’s 
production costs.  Travel time on route  ( ) 2 , 1 r r r∈  is determined by the Bureau of Public Roads 
formula used by many researchers:  
















15 . 0 1
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r f r K
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L t T ,                       (11) 
where  r T  is the travel time on route r ;  f t  is the travel time per-mile under free-flow conditions; 




j r V V is the traffic volume on route r  and  r Ω is the subset of 
travel choices involving travel on route r ; and  r K is the capacity of the route.
10  As in SWY, we 
measure travel time uncertainty on route r  by treating it as a constant fraction of travel time 
delay (travel time minus free-flow travel time) where the fraction is determined from actual 
travel on the free lanes averaged over 5:00a.m. to 9:00a.m.:   
r r T R ⋅ = 3785 . 0 .             (12)   
A private firm’s production costs include the initial costs to acquire the highway from the 
government and the costs to operate and maintain the infrastructure.  The marginal (production) 
cost incurred by motor vehicles is mainly reflected in pavement damage.  According to the U.S. 
Federal Highway Administration (2000), the marginal pavement damage cost for automobile 
                                                 
9 The driving cost elasticity of -0.3 is consistent with long-run estimates reported in Mannering 
and Winston (1985); the short-run driving cost elasticity estimate is roughly -0.2.  Sensitivity 
analyses indicated that are our central findings are not particularly sensitive to the assumed 
values of the elasticities.  
 
10 Our findings were not particularly sensitive to assuming powers of the volume-capacity ratio 
that were somewhat higher or lower than four.   14
traffic on an urban interstate highway is $0.001 per vehicle mile.  We do not include heavy 
trucks in this analysis, but it is useful to note that their marginal pavement damage costs range 
from $0.01 per vehicle mile to $0.40 per vehicle mile, depending on the truck’s weight and axle 
configuration.  Based on the evidence summarized earlier, we assume that pavement 
maintenance costs are reduced 20% under privatization and we specify the private firm’s 
operating cost (C ) as:  
     ∑ + =
r
r rL V F C 0008 . 0 ,                     (13) 
whereF is the fixed component of operating cost. 
To facilitate our simulations, it is useful to express operating profits, measured as the 
difference between toll revenues and operating costs, as a percentage of toll revenues.  As noted, 
Poole and Samuel (2008) find, on average, that operating costs account for 43% of U.S. public 
toll roads’ revenues.  Assuming operating costs would fall 20% under privatization indicates that 
65% of toll revenues constitute operating profits for a private highway firm.
11  
The initial cost of the road (I )—that is, the purchase price set by the government—
affects the private firm’s decision of whether to buy the highway.  When a private firm can own 
and operate the highway for only a finite period—as is the case for firms participating in recent 
public-private partnerships—the firm may not be able to raise sufficient revenues during the 
franchise term to recover the initial cost.  In our analysis, the road is already built and we assume 
that the private operator owns and operates the highway forever.  We do not make assumptions 
about how the private operator finances the purchase of the road or about the interest rate that is 
                                                 
11 This figure may be conservative because Poole and Samuel report that operating costs account 
for roughly 25% of toll revenues of private highway operators in the United States and in other 
countries. 
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paid.  Formally, a private firm is willing to buy the highway if the present discounted value of 




t ≥ = ∑
+∞
=0
π δ ,        ( 1 4 )  
where δ is the discount factor  and  t π is the operating profit at time period t.   
Equilibrium.  The objective of a private highway operator is to charge prices (tolls) that 
maximize the present value of its future profits.  Because current pricing decisions are not likely 
to affect future decisions, we can express the dynamic problem as a series of identical static 
problems and express equation (14) as( ) I ≥ −
− π δ
1 1 .
12    
The analysis of highway privatization can be formulated as a sequential-moves game: in 
the first stage, the government sets the price to sell the infrastructure; in the second stage, the 
operator sets prices and capacity allocation to maximize its objective; in the third stage, travelers 
choose alternatives to maximize their utilities given road prices and those choices determine 
highway travel times and travel time uncertainties.  Equilibrium of the game is then a subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE) and we characterize it by backward induction.  
Because the number of travelers is large, each traveler behaves as both a price taker and a 
traffic flow taker.  Thus, the equilibrium of the subgame at the third stage is a Wardrop 
Equilibrium (Wardrop (1952)), which can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of Nash 
Equilibira of games as the number of players goes to infinity (Haurie and Marcotte (1985)).  
                                                 
12 It is possible that current pricing decisions may affect future ones through reputation effects.  
For example, operators might develop reputations for “price gouging” and motorists would 
develop habits to avoid those roads.  But reputation effects are not likely to arise in the cases that 
we analyze here that involve some form of competition, such as private duopoly, because the two 
routes are perfectly substitutable and motorists do not incur costs from switching from one route 
to the other.  Reputation effects could develop in the monopoly case, but we also consider 
bilateral long-run price negotiations between users and the monopolist to limit monopoly power.     
   16
Denote j p as the price of alternative j and  ( ) J p p p ,..., 1 ≡  as the price vector; the market share 
vector  () () () ( ) p S p S p S J
* *
1
* ,..., ≡  denotes the Wardrop Equilibrium given 0 ≥ p .  In the appendix, 
we show that a unique Wardrop Equilibrium exists for a price vector 0 ≥ p .  
 
Policy and Competition Scenarios 
 
  We consider government policies to sell the road to the private sector with and without 
regulation and policies to allow different forms of highway competition with and without 
negotiations between the operator(s) and motorists.  
Highway Privatization with Toll Regulation 
We begin with a scenario, motivated by Engel et al. (2001), where the government 
chooses a toll when it sells the infrastructure to a private firm and the private firm is 
compensated with the toll revenues.  In our two-route network, government regulation is 
assumed to take the form of a uniform toll and the price of alternative j is obtained by dividing 
the toll by vehicle occupancy. The government seeks to maximize social welfare given by the 
sum of consumer surplus and the private firm’s operating profits: 
() ( ) ( ) p p CS p W π + =   ,      (15) 
where we do not include the subscript r for route,  ( ) p π denotes the operating profits accruing to 
the private operator at the Wardrop equilibrium given the toll, and  ( ) p CS  is the expected change 
in consumer surplus relative to the base case of no-toll.  Consumer surplus is defined by the log-
sum rule for nested logit (Choi and Moon 1997)   




d Z f e e p CS
i






,    (16)   17
where i τ  is the individual’s marginal utility of income determined from the coefficient of the 
price variable in equation (2) using Roy’s identity,  i D is the inclusive value given in equation (6) 
with travel times and travel time uncertainties at the Wardrop Equilibrium given the toll, and  
Δ{⋅} indicates the difference of the term in brackets when the equilibrium price (toll) is p and 
when it is zero.  
The government chooses a sales price I and a toll p  that maximizes the present value of 
welfare subject to the firm purchasing the highway, referred to as the firm’s participation 
constraint, and the government satisfying a politically acceptable reservation price, 
0 I , assumed 
to cover construction costs and referred to as the government’s participation constraint:  
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0 I I ≥ . 
Given these constraints, the actual toll could deviate from the optimal congestion toll
* p . 
To further the analysis, we follow Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Engel et al. (2001) and 
assume that the marginal welfare gain of a dollar to travelers is greater than the marginal welfare 
gain of a dollar to the private operator.  Accordingly, the government would like to redistribute 























( that is, the present value of the private firm’s operating profits covers its   18











, the government’s sale price is 
0 I  and the toll 
is the solution to the constrained optimization problem in equation (17) given that the operator’s 
participation constraint is binding at
0 I . The solutions for I and  p along with the Wardrop 
equilibrium given the toll constitute the SPE to the overall game.  
Given the government’s welfare “weights,” a simpler approach it could take is to define 
welfare solely in terms of consumer surplus and to determine the welfare maximizing toll and 
sales price subject to the firm’s and its participation constraints.  
Highway Privatization without Toll Regulation 
Government regulation of tolls may be justified to curb market power but such regulation 
may turn out to be unnecessary and may undermine the potential gains from privatization by 
impeding product differentiation of the two routes.  We therefore analyze models that allow tolls 
to be determined in various competitive environments and that may vary by route.  Again, the 
government chooses a sale price to transfer the highway to a private operator(s) and that price is 
aligned with the competitive environment—that is, we assume the government sets the price to 
extract the private operator’s excess operating profits under market outcomes subject to the 
government’s participation constraint.  The private operator then allocates capacity between the 
two routes and sets tolls to maximize its profits given the sale price.  We consider the following 
competitive situations.  
Monopoly provision.  Both routes are sold to a private firm that determines how road 
capacity is allocated () 2 1, r r K K and charges prices ( ) 2 1, r r p p  to maximize profits.  The firm’s 
one-period operating profit function is  
() ( )
()
( ) 2 1 2 1
2 , 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 , , , , , , , , , r r r r
r r m
m r r r r m r r r r p p K K C p p p K K V p p K K − ⋅ = ∑
∈
π  ,  (18)   19
where  () 2 1 2 1 , , , r r r r m p p K K V  is the traffic volume and  ( ) 2 1 2 1 , , , r r r r p p K K C  is the firm’s operating 
cost at the Wardrop equilibrium given the tolls and capacity allocation.  Given the government’s 
sale price, the firm solves  
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where K  is total capacity of the highway.  Without the participation constraint, the firm obtains 
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the government’s sale price is 
0 I and the monopoly’s allocation of capacity and tolls satisfy 




p p K K r r r r =
−δ
π
.  The sale price, profit-
maximizing solutions from equation (19) given the sale price, as well as the Wardrop 
equilibrium given the profit-maximizing solutions constitute the SPE to the overall game.  
     The problem in equation (19) assumes that travelers have no negotiating power in 
setting tolls; thus, solutions of the problem represent an upper bound for tolls under monopoly 
provision.  A more general formulation recognizes that tolls could be set through negotiations 
between travelers, represented by a third party such as the American Automobile Association, 
and the firm.  We consider an outcome as a bargaining solution if both the private operator and 
travelers are, on average, not worse off compared with the base case of no-toll.     20
Two extreme outcomes of the bargaining solution exist.  In the operator’s solution, the 
monopolist maximizes profits subject to the additional constraint that the change in consumer 
surplus is nonnegative.  In the travelers’ solution, travelers maximize consumer surplus subject 
to the firm earning non-negative profits.  A bargaining solution may include or lie between those 
extreme cases and can be expressed as the solution to the problem in equation (19) with the 
additional consumer surplus constraint that  ( ) s p p K K CS r r r r ≥ 2 1 2 1 , , , , where  [] s s , 0 ∈  represents 
the travelers’ bargaining power and its upper bound, s , is the change in consumer surplus in the 









r p p K K 2 1 2 1 , , ,  denote the bargaining solution without the operator’s participation 















, the government’s optimal sale price of the highway 
satisfies ( )
I



























, the government’s sale price is 
0 I and the solution to the bargaining outcome forces the operator’s participation constraint to be 
binding at
0 I .        
Duopoly provision.  In this scenario, the highway is partitioned into two routes with equal 
capacities that are operated by competing private firms and we assume that the government 
cannot sell the routes to the firms at different prices; that is,  2 1 r r I I = .
13  
When the two routes are simultaneously privatized such that the firms engage in Bertrand 
competition, the operator of route  1 r  solves:  





















     ( 2 0 )  
                                                 
13 Little capacity of SR 91 in California was lost when it was partitioned into two routes, one 
consisting of free lanes and the other consisting of toll lanes.      21





2 1 1 ≥ −
−
r





                                          2 0 1 I Ir ≥ .      
         
The solution to the problem, denoted by ( ) 2 1 1 r r r p f p = , is the toll schedule with respect to 2 r p .  
The operator of route  2 r  solves:  
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The solution to the problem, denoted by ( ) 1 2 2 r r r p f p = , is the toll schedule with respect to 1 r p . 
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of duopoly price competition is determined by the intersection of 
the two best-response functions.   
The government may also privatize the two routes sequentially.  Without loss of generality, 
we assume that route  2 r  is sold first.  The operator of  2 r  then sets a toll and commits to it.  The 
two firms then engage in Stackelberg price competition.  The operator of  1 r solves the problem 
given in equation (20) by choosing the profit-maximizing toll given the price on route 2 r .  The 
operator of route  2 r  then solves the problem in equation (21) with the additional constraint 
that () 2 1 1 r r r p f p = . 





r p p 2 1,  and note that in equilibrium the participation constraints of both firms are satisfied.  
When the operators’ present value of operating profits exceeds the government’s reservation price, 
the government sets the sale price such that the firm with the lowest operating profit breaks even in   22
equilibrium; otherwise the sale price is the reservation price ( ) 2 0 2 1 I I I r r = = and the duopoly 
equilibrium is determined by the solutions to equations (20) and (21) given the reservation price is 
a binding participation constraint. 
We can also account for bargaining under duopoly competition.  In the operators’ solution, 
given the toll of the other operator, each operator chooses the profit maximizing toll subject to a 
non-negative change in consumer surplus.  In the travelers’ solution, given the toll of the other 
operator, each operator sets the toll to maximize the change in consumer surplus subject to earning 
non-negative profits.    
Public-private provision.  The final competitive scenario we consider allows the 
government to compete with a private provider.  The government’s objective is to maximize net 
benefits that are composed of consumer surplus and its budget balance.  The government does not 
explicitly concern itself with the private operator’s profits; it assumes that the private operator 
makes profit-maximizing decisions.    
The private firm purchases one of the routes and the government continues to operate the 
other route (without loss of generality, we assume that route  1 r is privatized).  The government 
first determines the capacity to privatize ) ( 1 r K ; its sale price seeks to extract the private firm’s 
excess operating profits and it cannot be lower than the reservation price level.   Price competition 
evolves in two alternative ways: 1) the private and public operators set tolls simultaneously; 2) the 
government sets the toll on route  2 r  first.  Both cases correspond to those in private duopoly 
competition with the only differences that the public operator’s objective is to maximize net 
benefits, as defined above, and it does not face the participation constraint because it does not have 
to purchase its route.  We assume that the government eliminates the gas tax, but we also consider   23
the case where the government continues to charge a gasoline tax and does not charge a toll on its 
portion of the highway.     
  Investment decisions under privatization.  Thus far, we have assumed that the capacity of 
the privatized highway is fixed.  But as traffic continues to grow, the private operator may wish to 
expand capacity by building an additional lane.  We can determine the competitive conditions 
under which such expansion is likely to occur and the economic effects.  The median cost to build 
a lane-mile in the United States is roughly $2 million (Washington State Department of 
Transportation (2002)).  Given this figure and the other empirical parameters, the private operator 
will add another lane if the present value of operating profits from doing so minus the construction 
costs exceeds the present value of operating profits before the capacity was expanded. 
 
Findings 
In the simulations, we make the standard assumption that road capacity is 2,000 vehicles 
per lane per hour, which yields 12,000 vehicles per hour for the six-lane one-directional freeway 
under consideration.  In the base case scenario, we assume no tolls are charged and that travel 
time on the highway is 20 minutes implying a speed of 30 miles per hour, which is 
approximately the travel speed on the SR91 free lanes during the afternoon rush hour.  Based on 
our equilibrium model of the government’s sale of the highway and private firm(s)’ supply of 
and motorists’ demand for highway services, we simulate the economic effects of alternative 
privatization scenarios.  For each, we calculate the highway’s sale price, tolls, travel times, 
choice shares, the annual and present value of operating profits, and the change in the   24
government’s budget, consumer surplus, and social welfare.
14  The change in the government’s 
budget accounts for the revenues it receives from selling the highway, the maintenance cost 
savings, and the loss in gasoline tax revenues, and the changes in all the welfare components are 
expressed per potential highway user (N).  Finally, we report our main findings as single-period 
outcomes because, as noted, our dynamic formulation can be analyzed as a series of identical 
static problems.     
Highway Privatization with Toll Regulation 
  A pure highway privatization policy without any government regulation represents a 
dramatic shift in policy that may encounter political resistance because of concerns that the 
private operator would exercise market power; thus, it is useful to determine whether regulation 
might be a necessary concomitant of privatization.  In our analysis, government regulation 
consists of setting a uniform toll to maximize consumer surplus and operating profits or to only 
maximize consumer surplus.  It is reasonable to assume that a drawback of government 
regulation is that it would impose a uniform toll and inhibit differentiated tolls.  Indeed, one of 
economic deregulation’s major benefits was that firms were able to introduce price-service 
packages, which had been prohibited under regulation, to cater to different types of consumers 
(Winston (1998)).    
Table 3 shows that the government can raise welfare by privatizing the road and 
imposing regulation.  But as we have learned from the public sector’s reluctance to adopt 
congestion pricing, any proposed change in highway policy is unlikely to gain widespread 
political support if, on average, it harms motorists.  Motorists are able to gain if tolls are set to 
                                                 
14  Operating profits are determined as 65% of the toll revenues (Poole and Samuel (2008)).  We 
assume a 4.5% discount factor, which is consistent with recent long-term interest rates, to 
express the present value of operating profits.     25
maximize consumer surplus because the improvement in travel time and the rebate or 
elimination of gasoline taxes exceeds the modest toll.  The breakeven level of the toll is 
consistent with the government selling the road to the private operator at its reservation price of 
$12 million per mile, which covers the median per-mile construction costs of six-lanes 
accommodating traffic in one direction.   
When the government seeks to maximize consumer surplus and operating profits, it sells 
the road to the private highway operator for a higher price, $49.4 million per mile, and sets a 
much higher toll that enables the private operator to break even.
15  Hence, motorists’ benefits 
from improved travel times and the gas tax rebate fall short of their loss from the toll, although 
the higher toll is associated with greater improvement in the government budget and a larger 
increase in social welfare. 
In sum, if the government privatizes the highway but is responsible for regulating the toll, 
it must sacrifice one-fourth of the gains in social welfare to enable motorists to benefit from the 
policy.  Because we have indicated that motorists vary significantly in their preferences, it is 
natural to ask if regulation—which prevents price and service offerings from responding to 
preference heterogeneity—is necessary for motorists to benefit from privatization or could 
motorists and society realize larger gains without regulation because prices and service might be 




                                                 
15 The estimated sales price appears to be consistent with the $40 million per mile received by the 
state of Indiana for the sale of its toll road and considerably below the $200 million per mile 
received by the city of Chicago for the sale of its skyway.     
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Highway Privatization without Toll Regulation 
We now examine competitive scenarios where the private operator instead of the 
government is responsible for setting the toll and, as noted, the sale price varies with the 
competitive environment.
16      
  Monopoly.  As shown in table 4, we find that privatization reduces social welfare because 
the highway operator maximizes profits by setting a very high toll that significantly reduces 
travel times, but significantly increases the share of motorists who do not travel on the road.  The 
improvement in the government’s budget fails to offset the loss in consumer surplus and the 
monopolist has little incentive to differentiate highway services, which would benefit users given 
their heterogeneous preferences, because traffic is substantially reduced.
17  In fact, most 
motorists who continue to use the highway form carpools.  
Privatization could potentially gain public support by benefiting motorists—even without 
explicit regulation of the monopolist’s tolls—if policymakers encourage motorists and the 
highway operator to negotiate prices.  For example, certain railroad shippers have been able to 
obtain lower prices by organizing into a bargaining unit and allowing a third-party logistics firm 
to negotiate prices for them (Winston (1998)).  A similar practice could develop in a private 
highway market, where motorists are represented by a firm or association that negotiates tolls 
with the private operator.
18   
                                                 
16 The government’s sale price affects the private operator’s toll only when it is binding at I0. 
 
17 When the capacity of the two routes is allocated equally, the monopolist maximizes its profits 
and the difference between the profit maximizing tolls on the two routes is only about $0.002. 
Verhoef and Small (2004) also find that a private monopoly operator differentiates tolls very 
little.   
   
18 The framework could be expanded to allow all road users, including truckers, government 
services, and motorists, to be represented by an agent who negotiates tolls on their behalf.     27
As noted, two polar bargaining outcomes exist: the travelers’ solution and the operator’s 
solution.  In the travelers’ solution, tolls and the allocation of highway capacity are set to 
maximize consumer surplus subject to the private operator earning non-negative profits.  The 
central result shown in column 3 is that compared to privatization with regulation, privatization 
without regulation significantly increases the benefits to motorists and society by differentiating 
tolls and service on the two routes: 5 lanes become express lanes with a toll of $2.19 and a travel 
time of 17.6 minutes and the other lane has no toll and a travel time of 34.4 minutes.  Consumer 
surplus turns positive, on average, because travelers with higher values of travel time and 
reliability can pay a modest toll to use the faster lanes and travelers with the lowest values can 
continue to use the free lane, not pay the gas tax, but face a marked increase in travel time over 
the current situation.  Because even those motorists who use the free lane may wish to use the 
express lanes on particular days when they are anxious to reach their destinations, the benefits to 
motorists from privatization are likely to be broadly shared.
19  An interesting feature of the 
results is that travel on the faster route still moves considerably more slowly than a free-flow 
speed.  This is consistent with findings obtained by Small and Yan (2001), which indicate that 
when one route is essentially free, the other is best priced to allow some congestion, but contrasts 
with current pricing on most high-occupancy-toll (HOT) lanes that set prices to approximately 
generate free-flow speeds.  
Motorists’ welfare, on average, is unchanged under the operator’s solution shown in 
column 4 but tolls and service are even more sharply differentiated on the two routes and the 
overall gain in welfare is higher than in the travelers’ solution.  The latter occurs because the 
                                                 
19 Descriptive data summaries indicate that many motorists pay to use the express toll lanes on 
California SR 91 one or two days a week.  This behavior makes it difficult to calculate an 
accurate distribution of driver benefits by, for example, income level.    
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monopolist pays a much higher price for the road, thereby significantly improving the 
government’s budget.  
Of course, by the time a privatization policy is implemented, the growth in traffic will 
result in delays that are greater than they are today.  Under such conditions, tolls become even 
more essential to allocate scarce highway capacity.  The last three columns of the table indicate 
that privatization’s benefits to motorists and social benefits increase if we assume the population 
of potential travelers grows 20 percent, which generates additional congestion.  It is interesting 
that the travelers’ solution yields a much more differentiated toll in response to greater 
congestion and produces a social welfare gain that now exceeds the gain produced under the 
operator’s solution.  
Because it is unlikely that negotiations between motorists and the private operator would 
result in a polar outcome, it is fortunate that a wide range of negotiating outcomes could enable 
both the private operator and motorists to gain from privatization thereby enhancing the 
feasibility of the policy.  Figure 1 shows the tradeoffs under different allocations of highway 
capacity and finds that the potentially largest “win-win” outcomes occur when highway service 
is differentiated by a price-service package of one route consisting of 5 lanes and another route 
consisting of one lane.  Given this allocation of capacity, figure 2 shows the feasible tradeoffs of 
tolls and consumer surplus on the two routes, and figure 3 shows the feasible tradeoffs of 
consumer surplus and the sale price of the highway.       
Duopoly.  Policymakers may be concerned about allowing a monopolist to provide 
highway services and may be willing to support privatization only if duopoly highway 
competition can be created.  We initially assume that the highway consists of two equal capacity 
routes each operated by a private operator and that the gas tax is rebated.  We further assume that   29
the government does not sell the routes to the operators at different prices and is able to extract 
the excess operating profits only from the duopolist earning the lowest profits, potentially 
enabling the other duopolist to earn excess operating profits.   
As shown in table 5, duopoly competition (Bertrand) sharply reduces tolls from 
monopoly provision, reduces the loss to motorists, and improves welfare.
20  In the appendix, we 
present graphical solutions that show the equilibria under duopoly competition.  
Although a highway duopoly reduces motorists’ welfare loss from monopoly provision, it 
does not enable them to gain directly from highway privatization; thus, we explore the effects of 
allowing motorists and the duopolists to negotiate tolls (graphical solutions of duopoly equilibria 
under bargaining are also shown in the appendix).  We present the travelers’ solution in column 
3 and find that motorists now gain because highways offer differentiated prices and service that 
maximizes consumer surplus subject to the operators breaking even.  But because the duopoly 
operators are allocated the same highway capacity, motorists and the highway providers 
negotiate only over tolls.  In contrast, motorists and the monopoly provider negotiate over tolls 
and the allocation of highway capacity, which enables motorists to determine the combination of 
tolls and capacity that maximizes consumer surplus.  The difference between the negotiations is 
important because in the travelers’ solution under duopoly, we find that motorists’ welfare is 
lower than it is for the travelers’ solution under monopoly.  Travelers’ welfare potentially 
improves when we allow the duopolists to have unequal capacity (column 4), but the gain still 
falls short of the gain negotiated with a monopolist because the monopolist can provide an 
                                                 
20 The findings under Stackelberg competition are very similar to those under Bertrand 
competition for all the scenarios and are available upon request.  
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untolled lane while a duopolist cannot because it will not break even.
 21  Thus in a privatized 
highway market, motorists may be potentially better off negotiating with a monopoly than with a 
duopoly.   
  Public-private provision.  Finally, the government may be willing to privatize only part 
of the highway and keep one route in the public sector.  We assume the government privatizes 
the amount of capacity (part of or the entire second route) that maximizes consumer surplus and 
the improvement in its budget.  Given the government’s allocation of capacity, the public and 
private operators set prices—either simultaneously or sequentially with the public operator as the 
price leader—to maximize their own objectives (a graphical solution of the public-private 
duopoly equilibrium is shown in the appendix). 
  As indicated in table 6, the optimal capacity allocation for the government is to privatize 
only one lane (denoted route r1).  Given this allocation, we find the equilibrium under Bertrand 
competition generates a welfare gain but a loss to motorists (we obtain a very similar result under 
Stackelberg competition).
22  When the government does not charge a toll on its route (5 lanes) 
and the private operator charges a high toll for express service on its lane, motorists who are 
willing to pay for significant improvements in travel time and reliability have the option to do so 
and, on average, motorists gain.  But because a large part of the highway is unpriced, the gain in 
social welfare is less than the gain generated by the travelers’ solution to negotiations with 
monopoly or duopoly operators.  Motorists no longer realize a gain if the government does not 
                                                 
21 We obtain multiple equilibria for the travelers’ solution with unequal capacity; although the 
one with the greatest differentiation in tolls yields the highest welfare gains to motorists.  See the 
appendix for details.  
 
22 The welfare generated by the public operator, including consumer surplus and the budgetary 
improvement, exceeds the welfare generated by the public operator under alternative allocations 
of capacity.    31
rebate the gasoline tax, which would be justified because the government is still operating most 
of the highway. 
  Capacity Expansion.  Our assessment of alternative competition scenarios for privatizing 
highways has reached the somewhat surprising conclusion that motorists may be better off if 
they can negotiate tolls and the allocation of capacity with a monopolist than with a duopolist or 
if a private firm competes with the government.  In fact, this conclusion is strengthened if we 
account for operators’ decisions on whether to add capacity.   
  Duopoly operators would not add a lane to the highway because it would give rise to 
unequal capacity among competitors and they both cannot gain from the additional lane if excess 
operating profits are constrained to zero as in the travelers’ solution.  (We could not find a 
unique equilibrium for the operators’ solution under capacity expansion.)  A monopoly would 
also not expand capacity if its excess profits were constrained to zero in negotiations, but if that 
constraint were relaxed then it would find it profitable to add a lane that would benefit motorists.  
Based on the parameters of our model and assuming the construction cost of an additional lane is 
$2 million per mile, Figure 4 indicates that the potentially largest “win-win” bargaining 
outcomes occur when the additional lane is used to expand the number of (higher speed) lanes in 
route 2, meaning that route 1 would consist of 1 lane and route 2 would now consist of 6 lanes.  
Figure 5 then shows for this allocation of capacity that given an initial bargaining solution of 
either the travelers’ solution, motorist’s solution, or an intermediate solution, feasible “win-win” 
outcomes exist where an additional lane would increase marginal operating profits and consumer 
surplus.    
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Discussion 
  It is useful to assess our findings in light of certain assumptions and features of our model 
and sample.  First, we assume that motorists’ route and vehicle occupancy decisions are 
conditional on their choice of mode, residence and workplace location, and time of trip.  Mode 
choice is not a particularly relevant consideration because of the small use of public transit in our 
sample of Orange County households.  But by taking motorists’ location and trip timing choices 
as exogenous, we may be understating the benefits of privatization because households could 
reduce the cost of higher tolls by moving closer to their workplace (assuming the reduction in 
transport costs exceeds the increase in housing costs) as well as by traveling at different times of 
day, or increase the benefits from faster and more reliable trip times by living further from their 
workplace in lower cost housing as well as by traveling at more convenient times of day.
23 
  Our model accounts for motorists’ heterogeneous preferences and we conclude that 
privatization is a potentially attractive policy if the private operator’s pricing and capacity 
decisions is responsive to those preferences.  In table 7, we show how our findings are affected 
when we ignore preference heterogeneity and assume that road users have homogeneous 
preferences.  Generally, monopoly tolls are lower than they are for heterogeneous users because 
when users are heterogeneous, the monopolist sets high tolls to serve users with the highest value 
of time and reliability.  With homogenous users, the travelers’ bargaining solution results in a 
corner solution (i.e., the monopoly operator sets the lowest tolls that enable it to break even), and 
different market structures—monopoly, Bertrand duopoly, and Bertrand public-private 
competition—are less feasible politically because consumer surplus is always negative.  In 
                                                 
23 Langer and Winston (2008) find that the social benefits of congestion pricing are much greater 
when households’ residential location decisions are taken into account.     33
contrast, when users are heterogeneous, it is possible to obtain win-win outcomes for motorists 
and the highway provider(s). 
  As noted, our sample consists of Southern California motorists, who have a high value of 
time and reliability and who commute long distances, partly on a limited access highway.  Thus, 
it would be incautious to suggest that our findings generalize to every metropolitan area in the 
United States.  At the same time, major metropolitan areas, such as San Francisco, Seattle, New 
York, and Washington, DC, have travel conditions and motorists whose value of time and 
reliability are similar to those in Southern California—and there are several other cities with a 
notable share of drivers who are probably less than a decade away from willing to pay large 
sums to improve travel conditions.    
  Finally, following previous work on privatization, we have assumed that the 
government’s sale price for the highway is aligned with market outcomes when the 
government’s participation constraint is not binding; that is, the tolls under privatization without 
regulation are determined by market forces and the sale price is set to extract the private firm’s 
excess operating profits under the tolls.  Of course, the government may err in setting the sale 
price.  If its price exceeds the price aligned with market outcomes, tolls would be inflated and the 
feasible range of win-win bargaining outcomes would be reduced.  If the government’s 
reservation sale price is lower than the value we have assumed based on construction costs, the 
feasible range of win-win bargaining outcomes would increase.       
       
Conclusions       
We have developed an equilibrium model of the government’s decision to sell a highway 
and the supply and demand for highway services to investigate the economic effects of   34
privatization.  Because motorists’ values of travel time and reliability vary widely, we find that 
privatization can raise motorists’ and social welfare if it causes the highway operator(s) to 
allocate capacity and charge tolls that result in differentiated products that are aligned with 
motorists’ varying preferences.  This outcome can be achieved even if the highway is owned and 
operated by a monopolist, provided motorists are able to negotiate aggressively with the private 
highway operator to allocate capacity and determine tolls.  In fact, motorists’ may gain more 
from privatization if they negotiate with a monopoly highway provider than with duopoly 
providers or if the government owns part of the road and competes with the monopoly provider.  
Armstrong and Sappington (2006), among others, point out that even if an industry is 
privatized, it may be appropriate to regulate it; thus, it could be argued that the government could 
represent consumers’ interests by implementing regulations, which set consumer welfare 
maximizing tolls.  But we have argued that government regulation is notoriously poor at 
facilitating an environment that is responsive to preference heterogeneity and we have found that 
the failure to create such an environment in the case of highways would significantly reduce the 
welfare gains from privatization.  We have also argued that government does have an important 
role in setting the appropriate sales price; its failure to do so could adversely affect motorists.   
   We stress that our findings are conservative in the sense that we have focused on 
inefficiencies associated with current road pricing and capacity allocation, and to a certain 
extent, with current road maintenance policies.  Privatization is also likely to reduce highway 
production costs, which are particularly important when the effects of truck traffic on pavement   35
costs are considered, and to spur innovation in highway services, which would benefit all road 
users.
24    
Privatization is likely to be attractive in the current economic environment because all 
levels of government are interested in strategies—such as selling public assets like highways, 
transit systems, and office buildings—that could improve their budgets.  To be sure, the United 
States has not had any recent experience with a fully privatized highway market; moreover, 
important uncertainties surround the conclusions reached here, especially whether negotiations 
would enable motorists to benefit from privatization, whether regulations may be desirable and 
effective, and whether government would set an appropriate sale price for the highway.   
Recently, the federal government has begun to explore the issue of airport privatization 
by calling for privatization experiments.  Accordingly, it would be useful for the government to 
carefully design some highway privatization experiments that go beyond the restrictive 
framework of public-private partnerships.  We have identified some important features of a 
private highway market that should be borne in mind when experiments are designed and some 
uncertainties that experiments could help resolve.  Hopefully, future work will provide additional 
motivation and guidance for policymakers who realize that the time has come to assess whether 





                                                 
24 As noted, the pavement damage caused by trucks is much greater than the damage caused by 
cars, and the gas taxes paid by trucks do not cover the pavement costs incurred by truck traffic 
(Small, Winston, and Evans (1989)).  Thus, by not including trucks in the analysis, we are likely 
to understate the improvement in the government’s budget from privatization.   
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Appendix 
  This appendix demonstrates the existence and uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium in 
our analysis and presents graphical solutions to private and public-private duopoly competition. 
Wardrop Equilibrium 
We show that a unique Wardrop equilibrium for the third stage of the overall game exists 
for a price vector  0 ≥ p .  Define allocation  Ω → N g : , which maps potential travelers to the 
choice set, to represent travelers’ choices.  Traveler  s i' choice is denoted () i g .  The market share 
of alternative  j  under allocationg is denoted by 
g








≡ , where  j O is vehicle occupancy.  The transportation network is a simple two-route 
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The utility of choosing not to travel in equation (1) of the text is not a function of traffic 
volume.  Given a price, the utility function of a traveler choosing a travel alternative that is 
associated with a route in our choice set is a function of the traffic volume on the route because 
both travel time and travel time unreliability are increasing functions of the route’s traffic 
volume.  Formally, traveler  s i'  utility for choosing a travel alternative under allocation g can be 
expressed as 
                                               () ()( )
g
r i ig i ig V U U =  for  ( ) 0 ≠ i g ,                (A.1) 
where the choice  ) (i g is associated with route r  and subscript iindicates that the utility function 
is individual specific. The utility function has two properties. The first is    37
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which says that a traveler’s utility of choosing a travel alternative decreases as the volume on the 
chosen route i increases.  The second property is for r k j Ω ∈ ,  
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′ ′ < .                              (A.3) 
Since  j andk are two travel alternatives on the same route, they must have different car 
occupancies.  The property in (A.3) says that a traveler’s preference for two alternatives on the 
same route, but with different car occupancies, is invariant to the traffic volume on the route.
25   
Allocationg  is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if under the allocation each traveler 
maximizes her utility given the traffic volumes and price; that is, 




r iJ i i i ig , , ,..., , max 2 1 1 0 =  for all i.  Konishi (2004) proves the uniqueness of the 
Wardrop equilibrium in transportation networks with heterogeneous commuters for a model with 
only route choice.  We consider travelers’ route and vehicle occupancy choices, but the proof of 
the uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium follows Konishi’s idea.      
We first show the existence of the Wardrop equilibrium.  The third stage game of the 
paper is an example of the atomless game considered by Schmeidler (1973).  The game is 
anonymous in the sense that travelers care only about the number of travelers for each alternative 
but do not care about who they are.  Under anonymity, Schmeidler’s result is that the Wardrop 
equilibrium exists. 
The uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium depends on whether traffic volumes of the 
alternatives are the same for any equilibria g and g′. If the traffic volumes are the same, then the 
                                                 
25 For example, if a traveler prefers driving alone to using a carpool on a route when the route is 
not congested, the traveler still prefers driving alone to using a carpool on the route when the 
route is congested.    38
pricing decisions at the first stage and the welfare effects of the overall game are also the same 
for any Wardrop equilibria g and g′.  To prove uniqueness, we first show that traffic volumes 
on the two routes are the same for any two equilibria; that is, if  g  and g′ are two Wardrop 










′ = 2 2 .   
We prove this by contradiction.  Suppose allocations g andg′are both Wardrop 
equilibria and traffic volumes on the two routes are different for g andg′.  Without loss of 





′ < 1 1 .  This implies that there exists a traveler i and an 
alternative 1 r j Ω ∈  such that  () j i g = ′ and ( ) j i g ≠ . We can divide this possibility into the 
following cases: 
Case 1: () 0 = i g . This case indicates that traveler i chooses alternative j under allocation  g′ 
but switches to the no-travel option under allocationg .  We are able to construct the 
following inequalities,  ( ), 1 0
g
r ij i V U U ≥   ( ), 1 0
g
r ij i V U U




r ij V U V U 1 1 ≥
′ ; from property 





′ ≥ 1 1 .  Thus, we obtain a contradiction. 
 
Case 2: () 1 r i g Ω ∈ . This case indicates that traveler i stays on the same route but switches to 
another alternative with larger vehicle occupancy. This case contradicts property (A.3) 








r ij V U V U
′ ′ ≥ 1 1 . 
 
Case 3: () 2 r i g Ω ∈ . This case indicates that traveler i chooses alternative j under allocation 
g′ but switches to an alternative that is associated with route r2 under allocationg . By 




r ij V U V U
′ > 1 1 . Sinceg andg′are both equilibrium allocations, we can   39








r ij V U V U
′ ′ ≥ 2 1 . Combining the 




r i ig V U V U





′ < 2 2 . Given the total 
number of travelers on the routes is fixed (from case 1), both routes can be less congested 
under the allocation g only when some travelers on the routes switch to alternatives with 
larger vehicle occupancy.  Case 2 indicates that it is impossible for travelers to make such 
changes on the same route, so we can conclude that: (a) there exists one traveler (denoted by 
n) who switches from an alternative on route  1 r to an alternative (denoted by  2 m ) with 
larger vehicle occupancy on route 2 r ; (b) there exists one traveler (denoted by h) who 
switches from an alternative on route  2 r to an alternative (denoted by  1 k ) with larger vehicle 




r nm V U V U 1 2 1 2 >  with  1 m denoting the 
alternative on route  1 r  with the same vehicle occupancy as  2 m ; from (b) we have   




r hk V U V U 2 1 1 2 >  with  2 k denoting the alternative on route  2 r  with the same vehicle 








r V V 2 1 < , which again results in a contradiction.  











′ = 2 2 . But although traffic volumes are the same, the composition 
of vehicles with different occupancies can be different for g andg′.  If this is true, pricing 
decisions at the second stage and the welfare effects of the overall game can be different for the 
two equilibria.





′ ≠ ; that is, 
                                                 
26 For example, operators charge different prices for carpoolers and solo drivers under a policy of 
high-occupancy-tolls (HOT).    40










′ = 2 2 , a traveler obtains the same utility under the two equilibria from 
choosing an alternative; accordingly, her ranking of the alternatives should be the same for 
g andg′.  Thus, given prices, we obtain a unique Wardrop equilibrium.  
Solutions to Duopoly Equilibrium 
We present graphical solutions to private and public-private Bertrand duopoly 
competition.  Figure A1 pertains to private duopoly competition without bargaining between 
operators and travelers. Two equilibria exist; one can be obtained by switching the tolls of the 
other.  Tolls are strategic substitutes when a rival’s toll is low and strategic complements when a 
rival’s toll is high.  The main explanation for the V-shape toll reaction functions is motorists’ 
preference heterogeneity.  Users with low VOT and VOR take the route with the lower toll.  So, 
if the toll on route r2 is low, operator r1 prefers to cater to high VOT users (analogous to the long 
side of the market in a Hotelling line model) and sets a high value for the toll on route r1.  As the 
toll on route r2 rises, the mix of travelers on route r1 shifts toward a lower VOT and operator 1 
finds it profitable to cut the toll on route r1 even though usage increases.  This explains why the 
reaction function of operator r1 is downward-sloping for low values of the toll on route r2.   
At some point, the toll on route r2 is close to $10 according to the figure; operator r1 
finds it profitable to switch from a high-toll high-quality strategy to a lower toll and lower 
quality.  The figure shows that the reaction function takes a small downward jump.  As the toll 
on route r2 rises further, the mix of travelers on route r1 shifts toward a higher VOT and operator 
1 responds by raising the toll on route r1; the response function of operator r1 is therefore 
upward-sloping for higher values of the toll on route 2.    41
  Figure A2 presents duopoly bargaining equilibria for the travelers’ solution given that the 
optimal sale price of the highway is the government’s reservation price (the highway’s 
construction cost).  Again, two equilibria exist as one can be obtained by switching the tolls of 
the other and one of the two operators breaks even.  Tolls are strategic complements when a 
rival’s toll is low and they are strategic substitutes when a rival’s toll exceeds a threshold. When 
a rival’s toll is very low, an operator can improve consumer surplus by increasing its toll to 
maintain toll differences that benefit high VOT users.  When a rival’s toll exceeds a certain level, 
about $2.70 according to Figure A2, the operator cuts its toll to the break-even level to benefit 
low VOT users.  Because of the break-even requirement, tolls are quite unresponsive to a rival’s 
toll when they are strategic substitutes.  At the break-even level, a higher sale price of the 
highway would shift up operator r1’s response curve and shift operator r2’s response curve to the 
right such that tolls under the equilibria would be higher and reduce consumer surplus.      
  Figure A3 presents duopoly bargaining equilibria under the operators’ solution. The key 
difference between this competitive environment and duopoly competition without bargaining is 
that tolls are also strategic substitutes when a rival’s toll is high; thus, an operator’s response 
curve overlaps with its rival’s response curve leading to multiple equilibria.  Tolls are strategic 
substitutes when a rival’s toll is high because in response to an increase in the rival’s toll, an 
operator has to reduce its own toll to satisfy the requirement that the change in consumer surplus 
will be nonnegative. Tolls cannot be too low given the assumption that the purchase price of the 
highway cannot be lower than the government’s reservation price (construction cost).  
  Figures A4 and A5 present the travelers’ solution and the operators’ solution under 
Bertrand competition with unequal capacity allocation. Changing the capacity allocation does not 
alter the basic findings from duopoly bargaining with equal capacity.  However, the two   42
equilibria for the travelers’ solution presented in Figure A4 have different welfare effects; the 
one with the higher toll on route r1 (the route with smaller capacity) generates a larger increase 
in consumer surplus.  The government’s optimal sale price is at the lowest possible level, the 
reservation price; a higher sale price would lead to higher tolls under the equilibria and 
eventually reduce consumer surplus.    
  Finally, figure A6 presents duopoly equilibria under public-private competition.  There 
are two equilibria for Bertrand public-private competition but the two equilibria have different 
welfare effects; equilibrium A dominates equilibrium B in terms of both consumer surplus 
change and social welfare. The profits to the private operator under equilibrium A are also higher 
than the profits under equilibrium B.  Under the SPE, the government can restrict the equilibrium 
of the Bertarnd public-private competition to the better outcome by setting the sale price of the 
highway as the present value of private firm’s excess operating profits under equilibrium A.  
The reaction function for the private operator in Figure A6 is qualitatively similar to the 
reaction functions in Figure A1 except for a much bigger discontinuity at the transition point.  In 
contrast, the public operator’s reaction curve is nearly flat. This may be because the public 
operator takes into account not only the VOT for the marginal user but also the VOT for the 
inframarginal users.  The public operator is therefore reluctant to cut the toll because this would 
exacerbate congestion for users with the highest VOT. 
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Toll × dummy for high household annual income (> $60K) 
Median travel time (minutes) × trip distance (units of 10 miles) 
Median travel time × trip distance squared 
Median travel time × trip distance cubed 
Travel-time uncertainty (80





Female × age 30−50 × household size × carpool dummy
b 
 
Random components of coefficients 
Standard deviation of travel-time coefficient 
Standard deviation of travel-time uncertainty coefficient    
Common standard deviation of HOV2 and HOV3 dummies 
-1.4580   
0.8411   
-0.3489 
0.0684   
-0.0030   
-0.4541   
-6.9854  






6.2597   
Source: Small, Winston, and Yan (2006). 
a All coefficients are statistically significant at the five percent level.   
b The carpool dummy is set to one if the route-vehicle occupancy choice includes HOV2 or HOV3.         
     
Table 2. Value and Heterogeneity of Travel Time and Reliability 
a 
Item Median  estimate 
Value of Median Travel Time 
 Dollars  per  hour 




Value of Reliability 
 Dollars  per  hour 






 Median  travel  time 















a Source: Small, Winston, and Yan (2006). 
b The wage rate, estimated in Small, Winston, and Yan (2005), is about $23 per hour. 
c Heterogeneity is expressed here as the interquartile range of the quantity in question across individuals.   47
Table 3. Welfare effects under government regulation (with the gas tax rebate)
a 




the sum of  consumer 





Capacity (vehicles/hour)   12000 12000  12000 
Sale price ($ million/mile)  N.A. 49.4  12.0 
Toll ($)  0.00 9.31  1.69 
Travel times (min.)  20.00 12.33  19.12 
Aggregated choice shares (%): 
  No travel on the corridor 
  Travel on the corridor 
 
For those who travel on the corridor 
  Solo driving  
  HOV2 

























Operating profits: one period ($/person)
 b, c   0.00 3.66  0.89 
Operating profits: present value ($ million/mile)
d 0.00 49.4  12.0 
Change in gov’t budget: one period ($/person)
c, e 0.00 3.44  0.67 
Change in consumer surplus: one period ($/person)
c 0.00 -1.87  0.52 
Change in social welfare: one period ($/person)
c, f 0.00 1.57  1.19 
a We assume that the government does not offer differentiated tolls on the two routes.  
b Operating profits are determined as 65% of the toll revenues (Poole and Samuel (2008)).   
c The change in consumer surplus, government budget, and social welfare is measured relative to the no-toll 
scenario. These items and operating profits are divided by the total number of potential users N.  
d We assume a 4.5% discount rate.  
e The change in the government’s budget is calculated by subtracting the government’s gas tax revenues and 
maintenance expenditures under the  no-toll scenario from the highway sale revenue under privatization. Gas tax 
revenues are calculated assuming average gas mileage of 16 miles per gallon and a gasoline tax rate of $0.49 per 
gallon. 
f The welfare change is the sum of the change in the government budget and consumer surplus because the 
government’s sale price extracts excess operating profits.  
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Table 4. Welfare Effects under Monopoly Provision (with the gas tax rebate) 


































   Route r1 

























Sale price ($ million/mile)  N. A.  63.6  12.0  42.8  N. A.  75.8  43.0  53.9 
Toll ($) 
   Route r1 

























Travel times (min.): 
  Route r1 

























Aggregated choice shares (%): 
  No travel on the corridor 
  Travel on the corridor 
 
For those who travel on the corridor 
  Solo driving  
  HOV2 

































































Operating profits: one period ($/person)
 b,c     0.00  4.71 0.89  3.17 0.00 4.67  2.67  3.33 




0.00  63.6  12.0 42.8 0.00 75.8  43.0  53.9 






























Change in welfare: one period ($/person)
c, g  0.00  -1.84  2.07 2.95 0.00 -0.47  4.00  3.10 
a  Capacity is allocated optimally for each scenario.    
b  Operating profits are determined as 65% of the toll revenues. 
c The change in consumer surplus, government budget, and social welfare change are measured relative to the no-toll scenario. These items and operating profits are 
divided by the total number of potential users N.    
d  Population size (N) is increased 20% in the scenarios with traffic growth.   
e  We assume a 4.5% discount rate.  
f  The change in the government’s budget is calculated by subtracting the government’s gas tax revenues and maintenance expenditures under the  no-toll scenario from 
the highway sale revenue under privatization. Gas tax revenues are calculated assuming average gas mileage of 16 miles per gallon and a gasoline tax rate of $0.49 per 
gallon. 
g The welfare change is the sum of the change in the government budget and consumer surplus because the government’s sale price extracts excess operating profits.    49
Table 5. Welfare Effects under Duopoly Provision (with the gas tax rebate)  









Bertrand competition with 




   Route r1 













Sale Price ($ million/mile)
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Travel times (min.): 
  Route r1 
















Aggregated choice shares (%): 
  No travel on the corridor 
  Travel on the corridor 
 
For those who travel on the corridor 
  Solo driving  
  HOV2 









































Operating profit: one period ($/person)
 b 
   Route r1 
















Operating profits: present value ($ million/mile)
c
   Operator r1 
















Change in government budget: one period ($/person) 
b, d  0.00 1.67 0.23  0.37  0.08 
Change in consumer surplus: one period ($/person) 
b 0.00 -2.14 0.65  0.92  0.51 
Change in social welfare: one period ($/person) 
b, e 0.00 1.45 2.20  2.31  1.93 
a The routes have equal capacity under duopoly provision. We also show results with unequal capacity allocation for Bertrand duopoly with bargaining. There are multiple 
equilibria for the operators’ solution under Bertrand duopoly with bargaining. Details are shown in the appendix.    
b The change in consumer surplus, government budget, and social welfare are measured relative to the no-toll scenario. These items and operating profits are divided by 
the total number of potential users N.    
c We assume a 4.5% discount rate.   
d  The change in the government budget is calculated by subtracting the government’s gas tax revenues and maintenance expenditures under the  no-toll scenario from the 
highway sale revenue under privatization. Gas tax revenues are calculated assuming average gas mileage of 16 miles per gallon and a gasoline tax rate of $0.49 per gallon.   50
e In equilibrium, the government’s sale price extracts the excess operating profits of the operator earning the lowest profits (because the government cannot charge 
different sale prices for the highway capacity). The change in welfare is the sum of the change in the government budget and consumer surplus and the excess operating 
profits of the operator earning the highest operating profits. 
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Table 6. Welfare Effects under Public-Private Provision (with gas tax rebate) 














   Route r1  (private) 













Sale price ($ million/mile)  N. A.   10.3  11.2  10.4 
Toll ($) 
   Route r1  













Travel times (min.): 
  Route r1 













Aggregated choice shares (%): 
  No travel on the corridor 
  Travel on the corridor 
 
For those who travel on the corridor 
  Solo driving  
  HOV2 

































Operating profits: one period ($/person)
 b, c 
   Route r1 













Private operator’s operating profits: present value ($ million/mile)
d 0.00 10.3 11.2 10.4 
Government budget change: one period ($/person)
b, e  0.00 3.19 0.61 0.55 
Consumer surplus change: one period ($/person)
b 0.00 -1.72 1.01 -0.21 
Social welfare change: one period ($/person)
b, f 0.00 1.47 1.62 0.34 
a Capacity allocation between the two routes is determined by the government to maximize consumer surplus and its toll revenue.   
b The change in consumer surplus, government budget, and social welfare are measured relative to the no-toll scenario. These items and operating profits are divided by 
the total number of potential users N.     
c Based on Poole and Samuel (2008), operating profits are 57% of the toll revenues for the public operator (operator r2) and 65% of the toll revenues for the private 
operator (operator r1). 
d We assume a 4.5% discount rate.  
e The change in the government budget is calculated by subtracting the government’s gas tax revenues and maintenance expenditures under the  no-toll scenario from the  
highway sale revenues and public operator’s operating profits. Gas tax revenues are calculated assuming average gas mileage of 16 miles per gallon and gasoline tax rate 
of $0.49 per gallon.   52
f  The change in social welfare is measured as the sum of the change in the government budget and consumer surplus because the government’s sale price extracts excess 
operating profits.      53
Table 7. Simulation Results with Homogeneous Road Users (with the gas tax rebate)
a 
  Base: 
current 
situation 






Free Public Route 





   Route r1 
















Sale price ($ million/mile) 
   Route r1 
   Route r2 
 
N. A. 
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Travel times (min.): 
  Route r1 
















Aggregated choice shares (%): 
  No travel on the corridor 
  Travel on the corridor 
 
For those who travel on the corridor 
  Solo driving  
  HOV2 









































Operating profits: one period ($/person)
  
   Route r1 















Change in government budget: one period ($/person)  0.00 1.56  0.54  1.54  0.02 
Change in consumer surplus: one period ($/person) 0.00 -0.48  -0.09  -0.45  -0.10 


















Change in social welfare: one period ($/person) 0.00 1.08  0.45  1.09  -0.08 
a We modify the demand model in Table 1 in the following ways to eliminate the heterogeneity in motorists’ preferences: 1. set the random components of the coefficients 
to zero; 2. evaluate the toll, time, and carpool dummy coefficients at the means of the motorists’ profiles. We recalibrate the parameters ( ) δ δ λ ˆ , , , N  after those 
modifications following the same procedures described in the text.   
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Figure 1. Trade-off between monopoly operating profits and the change in consumer 
surplus under bargaining solutions for different allocations of capacity.  






























































Figure 2. Optimal tolls and consumer surplus under bargaining solutions 
 
 
















toll on route r1 (Kr1=2000)
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Figure 3. Government’s optimal sale price and consumer surplus under bargaining 
solutions 
 













































Figure 4. Trade-off between monopoly operating profits and the change in consumer 
surplus under bargaining solutions after adding one more lane for different allocations of 
capacity  
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Figure 5.  Feasible win-win outcomes for travelers and the operator from expanding 
capacity 
 





























































Initial outcome: operator solution
initial outcome: intermediate solution
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Figure A1. Solutions to Private Duopoly Competition 
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Figure A2. Solutions to Private Duopoly Competition with Bargaining: Travelers’ Solution 
 































Toll on Route r2($)
Equilibrium
Equilibrium
Solutions to Bertrand competition with bargaining: traveler solution
 
 
Response Curve of Operator r1
Response Curve of Operator r2
 
   58
Figure A3. Multiple Equilibria under Duopoly Competition with Bargaining: Operator’s 
Solution 
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Multiple equilibria of Bertrand competition with bargaining: operator solution
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Figure A4. Solution to Duopoly Competition with Bargaining and Unequal Capacity: 
Travelers’ Solution 
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Figure A5. Multiple Equilibria under Duopoly Competition with Bargaining and Unequal 
Capacity: Operators’ Solution 
 






























Toll on Route r2($)
Multiple equilibria for Bertrand bargaining competition with unequal capacity (Kr1=4000,Kr2=8000): operator solution
 
 
Response Curve of Operator r1






Figure A6. Solutions to Public-Private Duopoly Competition 
 































Toll on Route r1($)
Equilibrium A (constitutes the unique SPE to the overall game)
Equilibrium B
Solution for Bertrand public−private competition
 
 
Response Curve of Public Operator (Operator r2)
Response Curve of Private Operator (Operator r1)
 
 